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Summary 
 
This study investigates the effects of two technical enablers: Automatic Dependent Surveillance – 
Broadcast (ADS-B) and digital datalink communication, of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) under two separation assurance (SA) system 
architectures: ground-based SA and airborne SA, on overall separation assurance performance.  Datalink 
performance such as successful reception probability in both surveillance and communication messages, 
and surveillance accuracy are examined in various operational conditions.  Required SA performance is 
evaluated as a function of subsystem performance, using availability, continuity, and integrity metrics to 
establish overall required separation assurance performance, under normal and off-nominal conditions. 
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Nomenclature 
4D – Four Dimensional 
A/V – Air Vehicle 
ACAD – Assured Collision Avoidance Distance 
ACARS – Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
ACCC – Area Control Computer Complex 
ACF – Area Control Facility 
ADS-B – Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast  
AGL – Above Ground Level 
AMCCWS – ACF Maintenance Control Center Workstation 
ANSP – Air Navigation Service Provider 
APT - Airport 
ARTCC – Air Route Traffic Control Center 
ASAS – Airborne Separation Assurance System 
ASAP – Actual Separation Assurance Performance 
ATCSCC- Air Traffic Control System Command Center 
ATCT – Air Traffic Control Tower 
ATN – Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 
ATOP – Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedure 
CARTS – Common Automated Radar Terminal System 
CD&R – Conflict Detection and Resolution 
CDTI – Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CDZ – Conflict Detection Zone 
CERAP – Combined Center and Radar Approach Control 
ConOps – Concept of Operations 
CPA – Closest Point of Approach 
DLP – Data Link Processor 
DME – Distance Measuring Equipment 
ERAM – En Route Automation Modernization 
FIS-B – Flight Information Services - Broadcast 
FL – Flight Level (in 100 ft increments) 
FMC – Flight Management Computer 
FMS – Flight Management System 
FRUIT – (Unwanted) Friendly Replies Unsynchronized In Time (interference, background)  
Ft - Feet 
GMCC – General National Airspace System Maintenance Control Center 
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GMCCWS – General National Airspace System Maintenance Control Center Workstation 
GPS – Global Position System 
HF – High Frequency 
HRM – Human Response Model 
ILS – Instrument Landing System 
L/W – Length and Width Dimension 
MDT – Maintenance Data Terminal 
MFD – Multi-Functional Display 
MPLS – Multi-Protocol Label Switching 
MPS – Maintenance Processor System 
NACV – Navigation Accuracy Category for Velocity 
NAS – National Airspace System 
NIC – Navigation Integrity Categories 
NOC – Network Operations Center 
NM – Nautical Mile 
pC_A – Availability of communication subsystems 
pC_C – Continuity of VDL-2 message transmission and receiving 
pC_FC – Successful VDL-2 reception probability due to collision 
pS_I – Integrity of received VDL-2 datalink messages 
pS_A – Availability of ADS-B subsystems 
pS_C – Continuity of ADS-B message transmission and receiving 
pS_FF – Successful ADS-B reception probability due to Free-Space Loss and FRUIT 
pS_I – Integrity of received ADS-B messages 
PSR – Primary Surveillance Radar 
rC – VDL-2 message transmission rate 
RF – Radio Frequency 
RSAP – Required Separation Assurance Performance 
RVSM – Reduced Vertical Separation Minima 
SA – Separation Assurance 
SATCOM – Satellite Communications 
SDP – Service Delivery Point 
SSR – Secondary Surveillance Radar 
STARS – Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 
SWIM – System Wide Information Management  
T95 – The 95th Percentile Value of Collected Data Set 
TBO – Trajectory-Based Operations 
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TC – Trajectory Change 
TCAS – Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TCP – Trajectory Change Point 
TIS-B - Traffic Information Services - Broadcast 
TRACON – Terminal Radar Approach Control 
UAT – Universal Access Transceiver 
UHF – Ultra High Frequency 
URET – User Request Evaluation Tool 
VDL-2 – VHF Data Link, Mode 2 
VHF – Very High Frequency 
VOR – VHF Omni-directional Range 
VPN – Virtual Private Network 
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1 Introduction 
As the U.S. continues the National Airspace System (NAS) transition from a ground-fix surveillance 
system to a performance-based concept of operations to increase the capacity of the NAS and 
improvements in delays and environment, e.g., emissions and noise, the fundamental operational system 
architecture in separation assurance (SA) is also evolving based on two key technology enablers: 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and digital datalink communication.  This 
transition as well as the two technology enablers support the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) visions developed by the Joint Program Development Office (JPDO)1 and Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA).2 
ADS-B, with Global Positioning System (GPS) derived aircraft state information and intent messages, 
will lead to improved surveillance accuracy and track delivery performance for both ground and airborne 
situation awareness.  It is expected that the full potential of ADS-B’s surveillance capabilities will support 
visual acquisition, conflict avoidance and collision avoidance, separation assurance and sequencing, 
flight-path deconfliction planning, and simultaneous approaches in the future as specified in RTCA DO-
242A as well as many surveillance performance requirements based on ADS-B.3  It is important to 
develop a framework to evaluate these surveillance capabilities in support of concepts of operation 
(ConOps) under different SA system architectures. 
The NextGen plans also anticipate an increased demand for communication between controllers and 
pilots.  This is partially due to the predicted increase in traffic, and partially due to the increased 
complexity of routes and instructions.  To accommodate this need, data communications will first become 
an alternative to traditional voice communications, and eventually become the predominate form of 
communication.4 Based on the FAA’s current plan, Very-High-Frequency (VHF) Data Link, Mode 2 
(VDL-2), will be the format for the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) to support the 
Controller-Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC) as the ANSP communicates clearances, route 
changes, and advisories to the flight crew to maintain safe separation of NAS traffic.  As a key part of this 
ConOps, many datalink communication system performance attributes, such as dependency on range, 
interference, message size, and message rate, will impact communication performance. 
Separation assurance relies on knowing relevant information about ongoing traffic operations, which 
may include traffic state and intent information (provided by the surveillance function), and traffic 
management decisions, i.e., clearances, route changes, and advisories transmitted to the cockpit (provided 
by the communication function).  Since these subsystem functions are distributed within the NAS 
infrastructure, effectiveness in getting accurate and timely surveillance information and communication 
messages directly impacts the success of the separation assurance function.  Thus, the main objective of 
this study is to investigate the relationship between separation assurance performance and 
surveillance/communication subsystem performance under two SA system architectures, i.e., ground-
based SA and airborne SA.5 Independent variables are ADS-B surveillance and datalink communication 
capabilities and their performance attributes, such as availability, continuity, and integrity.  Availability is 
defined as the probability that the ADS-B or datalink transmitter and receiver are available for an 
operation.  Continuity is the probability that the system successfully completes an operation, presuming 
that the system is available at the start of that operation. Integrity is the probability that there are no 
undetected errors in a completed data message transaction given that the ADS-B or datalink system is 
supplied with correct source data.  Both SA system architectures in this study rely on distributed 
surveillance information and communication message exchange to provide the required separation 
assurance in assuring the safety of the flying public.   
Subsystem performances identified in both SA system architectures, which include surveillance 
systems and communication systems, human response performance, and terrestrial network performance, 
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are characterized according to a physics-based modeling approach, past studies, and existing performance 
standards respectively.  Additional system parameters, such as range of surveillance and communication, 
track density, and accuracy of the traffic track information are also evaluated.  A Monte-Carlo simulation 
is developed to include these subsystem characteristics following the SA system architectures such that 
various operational conditions and parameters can be evaluated to investigate the resulting separation 
assurance performance.  
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2  NextGen SA System Architectures 
NextGen is a broad term for the set of goals, programs, systems, decisions, and new technology 
capabilities that will modernize the NAS.  This modernization plan is laid out in phases, and culminates in 
a final architecture in 2025.  It incorporates many high-level concepts that have been under development, 
all with the goal of increasing safety, capacity, and efficiency.  The ultimate goal of NextGen is to 
maintain safe operations of the NAS with increased demand of air transportation services.   
This highlights the requirements of separation assurance, which provides safe separation among 
airborne traffic as well as aircraft ground traffic through the NAS systems.  These systems include 
surveillance, communication, and terrestrial network systems; NAS participants, which include ANSP, 
flight crews, and other stakeholders; and integrated processes to separate the traffic at a safe minimum 
distance.  Before examining required separation assurance performance according to NextGen’s 
surveillance and communication capabilities, i.e., ADS-B and datalink communication respectively, it is 
important to develop an understanding of the current NAS SA system architectures and SA ConOps based 
on existing surveillance and communication capabilities, since many of the performance attributes will be 
carried over into the NextGen SA system architectures. 
2.1 Current SA System Architectures 
The current NAS Separation Assurance system architecture is based on ground-fixed guidance (e.g. 
VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR), Distance Measuring Equipment (DME), and Instrument Landing 
System (ILS)), surveillance systems (e.g. Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), Secondary Surveillance 
Radar (SSR), and weather radar), voice communications, and a terrestrial communication system.  A 
high-level Operational Concept is shown in Figure 2-1,6 which divides the NAS into surface, terminal 
(Tower/TRACON), en route, and oceanic service volumes.  The focus of this study is in the Terminal and 
En-Route airspace service volumes.  Many aspects of the current SA system architectures, e.g., the 
 
Figure 2-1. Current NAS SA system architecture 
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communication network, remain relevant under the NextGen SA system architectures.  
 
The current NAS terrestrial network system architecture, shown in Figure 2-2, includes 
communication, navigation, surveillance, weather, and landing subsystems.7  As shown, surveillance 
information to the ANSP stationed in an Area Control Facility (ACF), and voice communication between 
the ANSP and flight crews in the aircraft to maintain the safe separations of all flights operated in the 
NAS are supported via two separate terrestrial networks.  Delivery performance of the surveillance and 
communication data to the ANSP is defined in ref. 8. 
Prior to the introduction of data link, all communications between the aircraft (i.e., the flight crew) and 
personnel on the ground was performed using voice communications.  This communications used either 
VHF or High Frequency (HF) voice radios, which were further augmented with Satellite Communications 
(SATCOM) in the early 1990s. 
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) was the first data link service 
introduced into domestic and oceanic airspace.  ACARS messages are transmitted over one of three 
ground subnetworks: 
 VHF is the most commonly used and least expensive.  Transmission is line of sight so VHF is 
not available over the oceans. 
 SATCOM provides worldwide coverage (except in polar regions) by means of the 
INMARSAT satellite network, and is a fairly expensive service. 
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Figure 2-2. Current NAS terrestrial network system architecture 
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 HF is the most recently established sub-network.  Its purpose is to provide coverage in the 
polar regions where SATCOM coverage is unreliable. 
Under the current NAS SA ConOps, the ANSP has the sole responsibility of separation assurance.  
Surveillance and communication infrastructures have been developed based on this ConOps as well as 
rules and procedures such that the ANSP can manage separation throughout the airspace.  
2.1.1 Separation Assurance Concept of Operations in Terminal and En Route Airspace 
Terminal Airspace 
In the terminal airspace, it is the ANSP’s responsibility to provide aircraft separation and expedite the 
flow of traffic between airports and the en route environment.  In order to complete this task, ANSPs are 
provided with automation and communication systems.  The automation systems (Common ARTS and 
STARS) deliver a situational display of the airspace with tracks and flight data.  The communication 
system gives the controller a constant voice link to the flight crew to issue commands or request 
information. 
The terminal automation system (STARS or CARTS) provides the controller with tactical conflict 
alerts for predicted encounters and imminent conflicts in support of 3 NM horizontal separation and 1000 
ft vertical separation.  The primary input for this process is short range radar, such as the ASR-9 and 
ASR-11.  The radars have a PSR and SSR system.  The secondary radar includes the Air Traffic Control 
Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS).9   The beacon system interrogates the aircraft every 4-6 seconds and 
provides the positional update to the terminal automation system.  The terminal automation displays the 
tracks derived from the radar data.  These tracks are correlated with flight plans from the Flight Data 
Input Output (FDIO) system.  Each correlated target has a data block that displays basic flight ID 
information, altitude and ground speed.  The display systems are called the Terminal Display Workstation 
(TDW) for the STARS and the ARTS Color Display (ACD) for the CARTS.   The terminal automation 
system will display visual conflict alerts with 40 seconds warning for predicted conflicts and 30 seconds 
warning for imminent loss of separation.8  
At present some terminal automation systems have been modified to process ADS-B data, which is 
much more accurate than radar.  The use of ADS-B positional data combined with radar and multi-
lateration systems promises a much more accurate separation assurance system for the future. 
The next layer of automation for SA occurs between aircraft equipped with the Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).  The TCAS will give pilots a traffic advisory (TA), i.e., when an 
aircraft has entered, or is projected to enter, the protected volume around the own aircraft, or a resolution 
advisory (RA), i.e., when a vertical maneuver should be performed to attain or maintain safe separation 
from a threat.   
En Route Airspace 
In the en route airspace, separation assurance remains the ANSP’s responsibility to maintain 5 NM 
horizontal and 1000 ft vertical separation.  Traffic surveillance is provided through a network of primary 
and secondary surveillance radars.  Separation assurance is performed in a three tiered fashion.  The first 
tier is Conflict Probe,10 which is performed with the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) system 
connected to the Host or the equivalent functionality of Conflict Probe in En Route Automation 
Modernization (ERAM) system.  Conflict Probe performs with a 20 minute look-ahead horizon on 
intended trajectories developed from flight plans, alerting on aircraft pairs that could potentially have an 
encounter. 
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The second tier is tactical conflict alerting performed by the ATC automation system, i.e., Host or En 
Route Automation Modernization (ERAM), over a three minute horizon on radar tracks projected in the 
future on aircraft pairs predicted to have a potential encounter.  ADS-B is being added as a new 
surveillance input, which promises greater accuracy for SA algorithms. 
The third tier is performed by the TCAS system onboard aircraft that detects a proximity conflict with 
another aircraft. 
2.2 NextGen Surveillance System Architectures 
ADS-B has been identified as the key surveillance system to replace/complement the existing ground-
fixed surveillance system to support NextGen separation assurance operations.  FAA selected ITT in 
August 2007 to build, install, and maintain the ADS-B nationwide network also known as Surveillance 
Broadcast System (SBS).11  A representative ADS-B surveillance system architecture is shown in Figure 
2-3.12  Following the surveillance track’s flow through the network, i.e., from top to bottom in Figure 2-3, 
ADS-B messages in 1090 MHz and UAT from ADS-B equipped aircraft as well as Mode S replies from 
Mode A/C/S equipped aircraft are received by the ADS-B ground radio stations.  This surveillance track 
information is then routed through a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to control stations, where 
cooperative and non-cooperative tracks are fused, and delivered to the FAA’s Air Traffic Control 
automation Service Delivery Point (SDP) via VPN to support various ground-based air traffic 
management functions, including separation assurance.  Under this ConOps, the ANSP with support from 
ground-based automation tools manages separation assurance within a defined airspace. 
In the reverse direction, i.e., from the bottom to the top in Figure 2-3, Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Rebroadcast (ADS-R) and Traffic Information Services – Broadcast (TIS-B) airborne 
subscribers will receive 1090 MHz (for UAT equipped subscriber) or UAT (for 1090 MHz equipped 
 
Figure 2-3. ADS-B ground-based surveillance system architecture 
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subscriber) track messages and Mode A/C/S track messages from the ADS-B ground radio stations to 
enhance situation awareness of traffic in the vicinity.13  In addition, 1090 MHz or UAT ADS-B IN 
equipped aircraft will also receive ADS-B messages broadcast via the same datalink for position, velocity, 
ID and type, operational status, target state, and trajectory change messages14 from ADS-B Out capable 
aircraft when they are within the reception range.  With the track information as well as intent information 
available on the flight deck, an airborne concept5, in which the flight crew manages separation supported 
by an onboard Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS), as shown in Figure 2-4,12 is also 
supported.  
2.3 NextGen Communication System Architectures 
In the future NextGen architecture, the ATN protocols will replace ACARS as discussed in Section 
2.1.  As air traffic increases, ACARS will no longer have the capacity or flexibility to handle the large 
volume of datalink communications.  ATN is planned to replace ACARS and will provide services such 
as authentication, security, and a true internet-based architecture.  The ATN will be implemented over 
VDL-2 sub network for continental airspace.   
The NextGen plans anticipate an increased demand for communication between controllers and pilots.  
This is partially due to the predicted increase in traffic, and partially due to the increased complexity of 
routes and therefore instructions.  To accommodate this need, data communications will first become an 
alternative to traditional voice communications, and eventually become the predominant form of 
communication.4 
The Data Communications program will be implemented in three segments, with each segment 
building on the capabilities of the previous segment.  Capabilities planned for the segments are shown in 
Table 2-1. 
Data communications will be fully integrated into controller workstations and aircraft cockpits.  At 
some point, regulatory requirements may be necessary to encourage avionics adoption.  A representative 
datalink communication system architecture is shown in Figure 2-5. 
 
 
ADS‐B,
TIS‐B,
ADS‐R
Receive
Systems
Reports
Airborne
Surveillance &
Separation 
Assurance (ASSA)
Processing
CDTI
Display
and
Control
Panel
Flight 
Crew
 
Figure 2-4. Subsystems from Aircraft Separation Assurance System  
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Table 2-1. Capabilities Planned for the Data Communication Program 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 
 Tower and En Route 
environments 
 Departure Clearances and 
Revisions while on ground 
 En Route ATC clearances, 
requests, instructions, 
notifications, voice frequency 
communications transfers, and 
flight crew reports as a 
supplement to voice 
 Terminal environment 
 Taxi Instructions 
 4D Trajectory agreements and 
updates 
 Trajectory conformance in En 
Route 
 
 Delegation of separation 
 
 
2.4 NextGen Separation Assurance Concepts Of Operation 
With the expected NextGen technology enablers in surveillance and communication, Net-Centric, 
Performance-Based, Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), and Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) 
are some of the key NextGen concepts1 that will directly influence the NextGen separation assurance 
capabilities.  The main objective is to increase the flow and accuracy of the information to increase the 
NAS capacity, reduce the delay, and maintain the flying public’s safety as demand for air travel grows.  
For this study, two separation assurance concepts with these NextGen concept attributes were 
investigated.  The first concept is ground-based automated separation assurance,5 in which the ANSP has 
the separation assurance responsibility.  The traffic surveillance capability will be fully supported by the 
ADS-B ground station and the terrestrial network.  Automation tools at ANSP workstations will be 
supported by the System Wide Information Management (SWIM) system with amended flight routes or 
updated flight data.15  The communication system will be supported by the VDL-2 datalink 
communication integrated with the aircraft’s Flight Management Computer (FMC).  The ANSP will use 
VDL-2 to provide separation assurance clearances, advisories, and route changes to the flight deck.  The 
flight crew will use VDL-2 to communicate with the ANSP for any separation assurance events.17   
Ground Radio
Aircraft Radio
Terrestrial 
Network 
ANSP 
Workstation
Multi‐
Functional 
Display (MFD)
 
Figure 2-5. A representative VDL-2 datalink communication system architecture  
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The second concept is the Autonomous Flight Rule (AFR) concept,5 in which the pilot manages the 
separation via the ASAS onboard automation.  All cooperative traffic track information will be supported 
by ADS-B IN including the intent information from the airborne ADS-B messages as well ground re-
transmitted track messages via TIS-B and/or ADS-R.17  The intent information could also come from the 
ground system via System Wide Information Management (SWIM).2  ASAS will provide the conflict 
detection and resolution functions, and recommended maneuver or route changes are provided to the 
flight crew to maintain separation.  Under this concept, no additional communication will be required 
between the flight crew and the ANSP, although the voice communication frequency is available for 
additional coordination, if needed.   
.   
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3 Required Separation Assurance Performance 
Separation Assurance requirements play a key role in air traffic control and flow management and 
influence the flight planning as well as the issuance of flight and route clearances.  In an ideal NextGen 
Trajectory Based Operation, it is conceivable to generate a gate-to-gate flight clearance with no SA 
conflict.  However, due to many different reasons (environmental, aircraft performance, airport 
conditions, etc.) it is very likely that additional flight plan adjustments may be required.  Some of these 
changes will be SA related.  No attempt is made here to address issues with air traffic management 
(ATM) and system-wide operation of SA.  Instead, we will focus on the impact of surveillance and 
communication timing on ground-based and airborne SA operations strictly as related to a pair of aircraft. 
An SA event is defined when a pair of aircraft come closer than a predefined safe distance of each 
other during flight.  Consider the ownship flying a predefined flight path as depicted in Figure 3-1.  To 
prevent an SA violation, the existence of the potential conflict must be detected, appropriate 
communication between the affected aircraft or between each aircraft and the ANSP must be completed 
and either the ownship or the incoming traffic must perform a lateral offset maneuver with a track 
deviation of Δχ to maintain a safe separation distance at the Closest Point of Approach (CPA).  Since all 
engaged aircraft are moving, the above distances can be translated to time.  And since SA operations 
require surveillance and communication elements, timing variations from surveillance and 
communication performance, and ground speed of the ownship, Vg, and required deviation angle Δχ can 
affect the overall time and distance required for SA. 
3.1 Proposed Approach 
Separation assurance relies on navigation, surveillance and communication.  We are trying to relate 
the SA capabilities to surveillance and communication system parameters.  The SA operation hinges on 
two fundamental separation concepts regardless of the ConOps associated with it.  These are: 
 Separation Volume is based on a horizontal and a vertical separation distance between a pair of 
aircraft.  This is typically depicted as a “hockey puck” or another arbitrary shape around either 

Vg Original flight path
Revised 
flight path
CPA
 
Figure 3-1. A current NAS separation assurance scenario 
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aircraft and defines the necessary protected airspace.  The size of the Separation Volume is 
primarily based on the aircraft physical and flight characteristics, navigation performance, and 
surveillance capabilities.  In addition, uncertainties associated with short term intent are addressed 
by adjusting the size of the separation volume.  In this study, we assume a hockey puck shaped 
separation volume with a radius which will be defined as the Conflict Detection Zone (CDZ), and 
a vertical dimension of 1000 ft. above or below.  It should be noted that this hockey puck is 
specifically defined for a given pair of aircraft and is placed about either the ownship or the 
engaged traffic. 
 Separation Threshold is the minimum required distance or time needed to detect, verify, and 
maneuver the aircraft in order to maintain clear of the required separation volume.  Separation 
threshold is primarily a function of surveillance capability, i.e., time required to identify and 
establish a track with a potential conflict, and communication capabilities, i.e., time to 
communicate with the ANSP for a separation assurance maneuver to maintain safe separation.  
Navigation system capability is also a major contributor, particularly when ADS-B surveillance is 
used.  Knowledge of intent can play a significant role in separation threshold for NextGen 
operations. 
The current standard for separation volume is based on legacy VOR navigation accuracies along with 
ATC surveillance radar precision.  In the absence of radar coverage, mandatory position reports are used 
to ensure SA. 
The intent of this analysis is to relate the surveillance, communication, and possibly navigation 
subsystem performance parameters to the separation volume and separation threshold distance or time.  
Such information can then be used to define or refine the subsystem performance requirements to achieve 
a desired level of SA performance.  However, both separation volume and threshold are strongly 
dependent on the ConOps associated with the air traffic management, air traffic control, and SA 
operations.  The focus of the discussion below is on the separation threshold distance or time for SA.  
This way, the calculations are applicable to the current separation standards as well as future operations. 
3.2 Conflict Detection Zone 
To support the study analysis, a conflict detection zone (CDZ) is developed to determine the required 
separation volume or separation distance between the ownship and an intruder to maintain safe 
separation.  The CDZ is based on the concepts introduced in DO-28918 that objective separation distance 
can be developed according to the size of the airplane, uncertainty in trajectories and the surveillance 
accuracy being broadcast in ADS-B messages.  According to DO-289, CDZ is the sum of the Assured 
Normal Separation Distance (ANSD) and trajectory and position uncertainties as shown in Figure 3-2, 
where Assured Collision Avoidance Distance (ACAD) is shown in Figure 3-3.   
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For this study, CDZ is developed based on ACAD, trajectory and position uncertainties, and a buffer 
zone to account for external environment uncertainties, e.g., weather, and an unexpected maneuver from 
either aircraft as shown in Figure 3-4.  CDZ is calculated based on ownship’s GPS-based position and 
speed data, and received ADS-B data for a particular traffic of interest.  The estimated future position of 
the ownship at a given time of t is shown in Equations 1 and 2 in a local Cartesian coordinate system 
(East and North of a reference point (EO, NO), where the reference point is the current position of the 
ownship). 
 
    
 
where ∆p and ∆v are position and velocity uncertainties.  The estimated future position error, err(t), can 
be represented by Equations 3 and 4. 
ACAD
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Conflict Detection Zone (CDZ)  
Figure 3-2. Definition of CDZ according to DO-289 
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Figure 3-3. Assured Collision Avoidance Distance (ACAD)  
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The CDZ is therefore determined as the sum of ACAD, errOwnship(t), errTraffic(t), and a buffer zone as 
shown in Figure 3-4.  ACAD is estimated according to Length/Width info in the Aircraft Operational 
Status message or the ADS-B emitter category from the Aircraft Identification and Category message.  
Position uncertainty at the time of determining err(t) of both ownship and traffic of interest is extracted 
from NIC with containment integrity according to ref. 19, and the trajectory uncertainty is estimated 
based on NACV from the Airborne Velocity message.   
 
Given the above track error equations, the estimated position uncertainty will depend on the time used 
to propagate the current track information.  If we assume that no maneuvering is required, a nominal 
limiting case for CDZ can be computed.  We call this CDZlimit and it is computed based on a tLimit which 
includes surveillance, CD&R, and communication times, but assumes zero maneuver time.  The t in err(t) 
is set to tLimit as shown in Equation 5. 
                           tLimit =  tSurveillance + tCD&R + tCommunication                            (5)                          
 The term tLimit determines a limiting case for the CDZ, when an SA maneuver would have to be 
initiated before a separation minimum is violated.  Surveillance time, tSurveillance, is the required time to 
collect track and intent information for traffic of interest.  The time required to process surveillance data 
to determine a conflict and generate a resolution is denoted as tCD&R. The communication time, 
tCommunication, is the required time to communicate a resolution from the ground to the flight deck in a 
ground-based SA system architecture.  
3.3 Maneuvering to Achieve Separation Assurance 
Regardless of the specific SA reason, all flight-path changes can be expressed using a combination of 
one or more of three basic maneuvers to maintain clear of the separation volume, i.e., maintain the 
minimum separation distance of CDZ at CPA: 
Lateral offset: Heading change is used to accommodate lateral separation.  A minimum of two heading 
changes separated by some time will usually be required.  The first heading change will result in a change 
of course as needed by the SA procedure.  Another heading change will be required to return the aircraft 
back towards its initial intended waypoint.  In the NextGen TBO operations, this is accomplished by 
CDZlim
Ownship
CPA
Traffic
ACAD
Error and 
uncertainty, 
err(t)
Additional 
buffer  (weather, 
unexpected 
maneuver, etc.
 
Figure 3-4. A Collision Detection Zone as a function of surveillance and communication 
performance 
  
22 
 
introducing an interim trajectory change point (TCP) on the current route.  Procedures involving parallel 
tracks will require more than two heading changes.  
Vertical offset: Change in vertical flight path angle is used to facilitate vertical separation.  Often the 
SA procedure requires an altitude change to accommodate crossing traffic.  An altitude change maneuver 
will require two adjustments to the vertical flight path.  The first change will initiate a specified rate of 
climb or descent.  The second will capture the target altitude. 
Speed change: Change in airspeed or Mach number is used to accommodate spacing or time of arrival.  
Multiple power adjustments are used to accelerate/decelerate and then maintain the desired airspeed.  
However, during certain high speed or low speed operations, further change of speed in a given direction 
may not be possible due to aircraft limitations.  Also, speed changes during continuous descent operations 
will be more problematic and will require more detailed planning. 
Since SA procedures will consist of these simple maneuvers, it is desired to parameterize and assess 
the needed time to perform each of these steps when performing SA.  To compute the maneuver time 
component of the RSAP, a conservative approach is to assume the SA maneuver must clear the entire 
hockey puck defined by CDZlimit horizontally or 1000 ft vertically at CPA.  The computed maneuver time 
is then added to the surveillance, CD&R, and communication times to arrive at the actual separation 
assurance time (ASAP).  By generating ASAP based on various system components’ performance for N 
runs, a minimum RSAP, tRSAP, can be derived from the 95th percentile of the ASAP as shown in Equations 
6 and 7 following the practices from other RTCA performance standard references.3, 13, 14  The time tRSAT 
is the minimum required time to prevent a separation assurance violation as defined by CDZ.  An 
example of lateral maneuver to remain clear of the separation volume is depicted in Figure 3-5.  In this 
example, the hockey puck is centered about the ownship and the ownship turns left to maintain SA 
relative to the traffic. 
                       tASAP_i =  tSurveillance_i + tCD&R_i + tCommunication_i + tManeuver_i                 (6)  
                tRSAP = 95th percentile of tASAP_i (i= 1, N)     (7)                       
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Figure 3-5. Lateral maneuvering to maintain clear of separation volume 
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4 Modeling of Distributed SA Datalink System Architectures  
To study the required separation assurance performance or RSAP, a Monte Carlo simulation is 
developed according to three key components in the separation assurance concept, i.e., surveillance, 
communication, and flight maneuvers as discussed in Section 3, to determine the actual separation 
assurance performance (ASAP) based on a set of performance parameters and nominal and off-nominal 
conditions, which are discussed in Section 5.  The minimum RSAP can then be derived from the 95th 
percentile from ASAP data. 
The performance of surveillance, communication, and flight maneuver are modeled according to two 
SA system architectures, i.e., ground-based and airborne concepts.5  Frame works of the modeling 
approach, which is developed based on datalink performance attributes of availability, continuity, and 
integrity, and datalink system performance parameters, are presented in the following sub-sections such 
that ASAP and associated surveillance performance and communication performance can be studied 
according to physics-based performance, specification-based performance, and performance results from 
past studies.   
4.1 Ground-Based SA Datalink System Architecture 
The ground-based SA system architecture is defined such that so the ANSP has the traffic information, 
including track and intent, automation tools to identify and resolve conflicts, as well as communication 
means to communicate with the flight crew to maintain safe separation according to separation standards 
of all flying aircraft in the designated airspace. The system architecture includes both surveillance and 
communication datalink subsystems. 
4.1.1 Ground-Based SA Concept of Operations 
The ground-based SA ConOps is adopted from the Advanced Airspace Concept.20  A simplified 
system architecture is shown in Figure 4-1.  Under this ConOps, the controller workstation has the ADS-
B track data, a data communication mechanism for transfer of command and trajectory change messages, 
and data communication integrated with the Flight Management System (FMS) on the flight deck to 
allow for loadable trajectory clearances. Conflict detection and resolution automation tools are also 
available at the ANSP workstation.   
ADS‐B
Radio 
Station
Surveillance
Terrestrial 
Network
Communication
Terrestrial 
Network
ANSP
Communication
Radio Station
 
Figure 4-1. A representative ground-based surveillance system architecture 
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4.1.2 Assumptions – Ground-Based 
The following assumptions are made for the Ground-Based SA ConOps. 
 The ANSP has the separation assurance (SA) responsibilities, i.e., SA maneuvers are provided by 
the ANSP  
 All flight plans are available to the ANSP through a network similar to SWIM 
 The ANSP has tools to perform conflict detection and resolution to maintain safe separation, and 
new routes are updated to a shared database 
 All aircraft are ADS-B Out equipped and no Trajectory Change (TC) message is required 
 Datalink communication is the primary SA communication mechanism, i.e., integrated datalink and 
FMS equipage 
 Voice communication will be used in UNABLE and emergency scenarios 
 Latency is the only performance parameter to be considered for the terrestrial networks 
4.1.3 Modeling Components – Ground-Based 
Characteristics of surveillance and datalink communication performance, human response 
performance during the communication exchanges to complete an SA maneuver, and terrestrial latencies 
are based on datalink characteristics and published reports and specifications.  Probability based system 
performance metrics and lognormal distribution in representing human response performance are applied 
in the Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the actual separation assurance performance (ASAP), where 
time for the surveillance, communication, and maneuver are measured according to specific test 
conditions. 
4.1.3.1 Surveillance Time, tSurveillance 
The traffic track surveillance is modeled using the ADS-B network as shown in Figure 4-2, which is 
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Figure 4-2. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time from 1090 MHz ADS-B 
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simplified from Figure 2-3 to objectively quantify the surveillance time, tSurveillance_1090, needed using the 
1090 MHz datalink to establish a track.  The model considers availability, continuity, and integrity 
performance as defined in RTCA DO-242A,3 where availability for the ADS-B transmission and receipt 
are 0.9995 or a combined availability of 0.999 (pS_A), continuity (pS_C) is 0.9998 per flight hour, and 
integrity (pS_I)  is 1-10-6 per ADS-B report. Detection of data corruption is performed by a higher level 
application or a human operator. 
The terrestrial latency is modeled according to a normal distribution, Latency(μS_T, σS_T), with a 95th 
percentile of 3.0 sec8 and a maximum of 3.5 sec,7 as shown in Figure 4-3. 
4.1.3.1.1 ADS-B Ground Receiver Model 
ADS-B ground receiver reception performance is modeled using the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter 
(ES) reception model21 with adjustments made to match a set of ADS-B ground receiver data in the range 
between 30 to 90 NM, i.e., the range of interest, as shown in Figure 4.4.  The range is the distance from 
the ADS-B equipped aircraft to the ADS-B ground receiver.  The model considers the range dependency 
due to transmitter power, receiver minimum trigger level, decoding, and interference, aka the FRUIT rate.  
The ADS-B transmitter power is set for Class A3 at 200 W, and the minimum trigger level is set at -84 
dBm as specified in DO-260B.14  The FRUIT rate of the 1090 MHz ES reception model was adjusted to 
have the levels of Mode A/C and Mode S interference similar to the set of ground receiver data used for 
verification as shown in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. Comparison of FRUIT rate between the verification data and the model 
 
 
Figure 4-3. A representative terrestrial latency in normal distribution 
Data Provided by  FAA Tech Center 1090 MHz ES Reception Model
Test Case FRUIT Rate/sec Mode A/C Mode S FRUIT Rate/sec Mode A/C Mode S
1 11300 10000 1300 12287 11164 1123
2 17800 16000 1800 17516 15800 1716
3 21200 19000 2200 22108 19930 2128
4 23600 21000 2600 23639 21153 2486
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The modeled ADS-B surveillance performance as shown in Figure 4-2 also considers the ADS-B track 
position and velocity message broadcast rate, which is 2 messages/sec.14 Detection of an undetected error 
during a completed transmission is assumed to be made by a higher-level application or a human 
operator.  Human operator detection by the ANSP, i.e., reviewing the track and determining if the track is 
incorrect after loading to a display, is used in this study.  A lognormal mean of 4 sec, with 99th percentile 
at 6 sec, and a maximum of 12 sec is modeled.8      
The update rate of the surveillance cycle of 1 sec, rS, as shown in Figure 4-2 is based on the rate of a 
State Vector (SV) report, which is assembled at one second per report.3  The delay due to incomplete 
transmission is also one second, since the SV report is automatically assembled at this rate, even if there 
is an incomplete transmission, in which case the position and velocity field will be filled with previously 
received data. 
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Figure 4-4. Verification of an ADS-B ground receiver model 
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4.1.3.1.2 Off-Nominal Conditions 
The following off-nominal conditions are considered in determining the required surveillance time, 
tSurveillance_1090, as shown in Figure 4-2.  
1. Failure of the ADS-B transmission and receiving systems: When ADS-B systems, e.g., GPS or 
ADS-B receiver malfunctions, the fall-back of the surveillance system is the secondary 
surveillance radar (SSR).  Surveillance systems failure is characterized by availability (pS_A).  The 
scan rate of SSR is considered in determining the required surveillance time, tSurveillance_1090.  The 
accuracy of SSR will affect the CDZ as discussed in Section 3 and is modeled according to Table 
4-2. 
2. When GPS accuracy is changed by applying a correction technology, i.e., WAAS, Selective 
Availability off or on, then CDZ is adjusted according to corresponding NIC and NACV values as 
shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2. Surveillance uncertainty and accuracy 
Additional off-nominal operational procedures, which may have an impact on the surveillance time, 
are also being considered.  Figure 4-5 shows two independent dependencies on surveillance time other 
than the 1090 MHz ADS-B track.  The first is a scenario requiring additional coordination among ground 
ATC facilities to send the required intent information to the SA automation tools.  In this case, a modified 
flight plan or clearance for another flight may have an undetected separation conflict with a particular 
flight.  Such information may take several ATC coordination nodes, n, to enter the air traffic management 
automation tools before it is detected that a separation maneuver is required. The parameter n is randomly 
selected according to the following rule: n=0 at 80%, n=1 at 15%, and n=2 at 5%.  A probability of p11 is 
given for such occurrences, where p11=2% is selected as the baseline.  Latency at the Host Computer and 
ANSP Workstation is estimated at 1 sec each.  
The second off-nominal procedure is a scenario where the ANSP is slow in manually entering the 
intent information due to a lapse.  This scenario is given a probability of 1-p1, where p1 is the probability 
that the surveillance data are provided by 1090 MHz ADS-B messages, and the time lapse, ANSPLAPSE, is 
modeled by a normal distribution latency represented by a mean of μL and a standard deviation of σL, 
Latency(μL, σL), at 15 sec and 3 sec, respectively.  The parameter setting p1 = 99.9% is selected as the 
baseline. 
4.1.3.2 Communication Time, tCommunication 
A VDL-2 based datalink communication model is developed to determine the communication time, 
tCommunication, needed to complete an SA communication transaction between the ANSP and the flight crew.  
A representative flow of communication exchanges between the ground and the flight deck after a 
NIC NACv
  RC   
Horizontal Velocity
Error (95%)
Vertical Geometric 
Velocity Error (95%)
WAAS 10 * <25 m 2* <3m/s <15 ft/sec
Selective Aavailability ‐ off 9* <75 m 2*
Selective Aavailability ‐  on 7* <0.2 NM 1* <10m/s <50 ft/sec
TRACON SSR 6 (RNP‐0.3)** <0.6 NM 1**
Center SSR 4 (RNP‐1)** <2 NM 1**
*   DO‐242A (ref. 3)
** NAS‐SR‐1000 (ref. 8)
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conflict resolution is generated from ground SA automation tools is shown in Figure 4-6.  The modeling 
components are described below. 
 
tSurveillance_1090
tSurveillance_intent
p1 with no ANSP lapse
1-p1 with ANSP lapse
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Figure 4-5. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance performance, tSurveillance 
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Figure 4-6. Components to determine the required communication performance, tCommunication 
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1) tANSP_Review: The human response model (HRM) for the ANSP to review the generated conflict 
resolution is represented by a lognormal function with a mean of 4 sec, 99th percentile at 6 sec, and 
a maximum of 12 sec8 as shown in Figure 4-7.  The lognormal function and its appropriateness for 
the HRM are discussed in the next section. 
2) tUplink: The time for successful uplink/downlink using VDL-2 datalink communication is modeled 
based on location and distance to the ground radio station(s), average message rate and length, and 
collision characteristics (distance to other transmitting aircraft) of a p-persistent Carrier Sense 
Multiple Access (CSMA) channel access protocol.22 The basic processing and transmission time 
of a single message is 0.350 sec.23 If the channel is busy (i.e. transmission isn’t immediately 
successful), the protocol specifies the delay before retransmission (using default characteristic 
value) as 1.0 + 2.0×0.6075 + r×0.88 sec where r is a uniform random distribution. 
3) tPilot_Preview: The time for the pilot to preview an uplinked resolution message before loading it to 
the FMC is modeled with a lognormal distribution with a mean of 2.23 sec and a standard 
deviation of 0.35 sec.24  The time for loading the uplinked route or message to the FMC is 
determined to be insignificant.  
4) tPilot_Review: The time for the pilot to review the route or message in the FMC before executing is 
modeled by a lognormal distribution with a mean of 1.89 sec and a standard deviation of 0.44 
sec.24 
5) tNegotiation: This term describes the time for the pilot to negotiate with the ANSP if an UNABLE is 
the response to the uplinked resolution.  The pilot would downlink the response via datalink, the 
ANSP would use voice to provide a revised resolution, and the pilot would read back the revised 
resolution to confirm.  A lognormal distribution to represent a mean of 12.88 sec with a standard 
deviation of 4.95 sec is modeled.25 A 1% probability of this event occurrence is estimated as the 
baseline. 
6) tPilot_Execute: This term describes the time for a pilot to execute a loaded route, once he has reviewed 
and approved it.  This is determined to be negligible for this study and is set to 0.   
 
 
 
Figure 4-7. A representative ANSP-review human response model in lognormal distribution  
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4.1.3.2.1 HRM – Human Response Model 
The HRM approximates the statistical time distribution that a pilot or controller would take to perform 
a specific task.  Based on the results of Sheridan26 and Consiglio24, a lognormal distribution is a good fit 
to the typical probability density for human response time as shown in Equation 8. 
                                     HRM(μ,σ)=ln	N(μ,σ)                       (8) 
where μ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the underlying normal distribution, N. The 
distribution is right-skewed and always greater than zero.  This is an appropriate distribution if a 
variable can be thought of as the multiplicative product of many independent random variables, 
each of which is positive. Multiple elements of pilot response delay are well fit by log-normal 
distributions in ref. 24 and are used as applicable in this model.  An example is shown in Figure 
4-7 for an ANSP reviewing a resolution performance. 
4.1.3.2.2 VDL-2 Reception Model 
The VDL-2 uplink and downlink reception performance is modeled as shown in Figure 4-8, where 
availability, continuity, and integrity are constructed similar to the ADS-B reception model as described 
in Section 4.1.3.1.  Voice communication is used when the datalink subsystems are not available.  The 
datalink completion time, i.e., the time for a message from a radio frequency (RF) transmitter to a 
receiver, accounting for collision characteristics, is modeled according to the number of ground stations 
and the traffic density.22   A 0.35 second per message transmission rate, rC, is chosen based on 250 msec 
for packet transmission and 100 msec for processing delays at the 95th percentile.23   
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Figure 4-8. A block diagram to determine the required communication time via VDL-2 
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4.1.3.3 Maneuver Time, tManeuver 
The dynamic performance of the aircraft from maneuver initiation until closest point of approach is 
modeled with a simple, but realistic, model for both the lateral offset and vertical offset maneuvers. 
4.1.3.3.1 Lateral Offset Maneuver 
The lateral offset maneuver time is determined by the time required to initiate, change, and capture a 
new heading plus the time to reach the CPA.  As indicated earlier, the CPA for a lateral offset maneuver 
is the tangent point of the relative flight path to the CDZ after the heading change.  It is assumed that the 
entire maneuver is conducted at a constant ground speed.  The initiation, change, and capture of the new 
heading is approximated as the summation of 
1. 1.5 second initiation of turn 
2. 1 sec turn at bank angle of 15 degrees (rolling into turn) 
3. N sec turn at bank angle of 30 degrees 
4. 1 sec turn at bank angle of 15 degrees (rolling out of turn) 
5. 1.5 second new heading capture 
The rate of change of heading in steps 2 through 4 is calculated from the ground speed. The time 
length of step 3 is adjusted to complete the necessary heading change given the rate of change of heading 
in each step.  For this study, the overall heading change is fixed at 15 degrees.  After determining the 
distance travelled during the heading change, the time needed to traverse the remaining distance to the 
CPA at the fixed ground speed is determined and added to the previous times to determine the total lateral 
offset maneuver time. 
No specific probabilistic elements are included in the calculation of lateral offset maneuver time.  The 
only uncertainty comes from the size of CDZ and therefore the length of time needed to clear the CDZ at 
the CPA.  The effects of winds were not modeled. 
4.1.3.3.2 Vertical Offset Maneuver 
The vertical offset maneuver time is determined by the time required to transition the aircraft 1000 ft 
of altitude, the standard vertical separation below FL 290 and above FL 290 for RVSM. The time is 
calculated using a single average rate of climb/descent over the entire altitude with no transition times at 
either end.  The rate of climb is selected by engineering estimate from a normal distribution with a mean 
value of 1000 ft/min and a standard deviation of 200 ft/min.  An upper bound of 2000 ft/min and a lower 
bound of 500ft/min are enforced as rates of climb/descent outside these values would be rejected by the 
ANSP. 
4.1.3.4 Modeling Summary 
A summary of the ground-based SA modeling is shown in Figure 4-9, with the surveillance 
performance model, the communication performance model, and the SA maneuver model as discussed in 
previous sections.  TCD&R is the time for the SA automation to detect the conflict and develop and display 
a resolution.  A two second delay is estimated for tCD&R.13 
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4.2 Airborne SA Datalink System Architecture 
The airborne SA system architecture is developed based on the AFR concept,5 where separation 
assurance decisions and actions are developed based on ownship and traffic aircraft track information and 
intent information derived from broadcast ADS-B messages.  The AFR concept allows for an alternative 
of receiving intent information from IFR aircraft via datalink from the ground, and both methods of 
receiving intent information were addressed in this study. Within the designated airspace, the flight crew 
will be able to perform self-separation in a system architecture as shown in Figure 4-10. 
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Figure 4-9. Required Separation Assurance Performance, tRSAP 
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Figure 4-10. A representative Airborne-Centric separation assurance system architecture 
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4.2.1 Airborne SA Concept of Operations 
Under AFR, the flight crew and the airplane that is certified for AFR will have the capability to 
perform self-separation in a designated airspace with mixed-equipped traffic, i.e., IFR and/or AFR.  An 
onboard Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS)17 provides pilots with information on the 
conflicts, alerts, and resolutions, and provides an interface for pilots to select and load resolution 
maneuvers into the FMS or execute resolutions through tactical flight controls.  
4.2.2 Assumptions – Airborne Concept 
The following modeling assumptions are made for the Airborne SA ConOps. 
 The AFR-equipped airplane performs self-separation without ANSP separation services. 
 AFR flight crews have automation tools certified by the FAA for self-separation. 
 IFR traffic has the right-of-way. 
 Intent messages are essential to AFR operations. 
 A maximum of four-TC messages broadcast will be required. 
 As an alternative, IFR flight plans or intent will be uplinked to AFR via datalink per 
request. 
 No communication with the ANSP is required for SA. 
4.2.3 Modeling Components – Airborne Concept 
The airborne concept relies on 1090 MHz ES messages, which include Airborne Position, Airborne 
Velocity, Aircraft Identification and type, Aircraft Operational Status, Target State, and Trajectory 
Change reports, to receive the traffic track and intent information as defined DO-260B.14  These message 
are then assembled as ADS-B reports to support various applications, such as separation assurance and 
sequencing, conflict avoidance and collision avoidance, and flight path deconfliction planning.3  For the 
AFR, the intent information, i.e., Target State (TS) messages for short-term intent information and 
Trajectory Change (TC) messages for long-term intent information, is used in automated conflict 
management to support cooperative separation. 
4.2.3.1 Surveillance Time, tSurveillance 
Since the Target State and Trajectory Change messages are broadcast at a slower rate than the 
Airborne Position and Velocity messages, successful reception of up to four TC messages is used to 
determine the required surveillance time, tSurveillance_Intent, for the baseline case.  To meet the maximum 
ADS-B broadcast rate of 6.2 messages/sec,14 the TC messages are assumed to be broadcast sequentially at 
a rate of 0.8 messages/sec or 0.2 message/sec for four TC messages or 0.4 message/sec for two TC 
messages, which leads to a five-second (4 TC messages) or 2.5-second (2 TC messages) interval to 
broadcast a complete set of TC messages.  The value for tSurveillance_Intent is then determined by the time 
needed to receive all four TC messages at the receiver.  The time to receive up to four TC messages is 
modeled as shown in Figure 4-11. The 1090 MHz ES reception model for airborne transmission19 is used 
to model the free-space-loss and interference due to FRUIT.  The ADS-B transmitter power is set for 
Class A3 at 200 W, and the minimum trigger level is set at -84 dBm as defined in DO-260B.14  The 
surveillance range in the airborne case is the distance between the transmitting aircraft and the receiving 
aircraft.  Surveillance system availability, continuity, and integrity are kept the same as in the ground-
based system architecture. 
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To enable modeling of scenarios where intent data are uplinked to the flight deck from the ground 
versus scenarios where intent data is available via ADS-B ES, a probability of p2 is assumed that intent 
information is provided by airborne ADS-B ES, and under a probability of 1- p2 intent information is 
provided by the ground as shown in Figure 4-12.  For the ground-provided intent information scenario, 
the downlink request and uplink intent messages are modeled using VDL-2 reception performance as 
presented in Section 4.1.3.2.  A one-second processing time is assumed for ground automation to respond 
to the downlinked intent request.  From one to eight intent messages are selected from a uniform 
distribution, which gives an average of close to 4 messages that are equivalent to the airborne ADS-B 
intent messages, and uplinked via VDL-2 to the flight deck.   
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Figure 4-11. An intent-based Airborne-Centric concept required surveillance time, tSurveillance 
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Figure 4-12. A block diagram to determine the required surveillance time  
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4.2.3.2 Maneuver 
The maneuver for the AFR is the same as ground-based offset maneuvers described in Section 4.1.3.3. 
4.3 Summary of Modeling References 
Applicable performance of each subsystem under the ground-based and airborne system architectures 
is summarized in Tables 4-3 and 4-4 for the surveillance model and communication model respectively. 
Table 4-3. Summary of surveillance modeling and performance references  
Surveillance Descriptions Figure Modeling Assumptions References
p S_FF Surveillance reception probability 4‐2 f(D, ρTraffic) Ref. 21
p S_A Availability of surveillance 4‐2 0.9995 Ref. 3
p S_C Continuity of surveillance 4‐2 0.9998 Ref. 3
p S_I Integrity of surveillance 4‐2 10‐6 Ref. 3
pWAAS_Availability Availability of WASS 4‐2 0.99999 Ref. 8
ρTraffic Traffic density 4‐2
TRACON
High ‐ 5.25/NM 
Medium ‐ 3.5/NM 
Low ‐ 1.6/NM Ref. 14
En Route
0.32/NM Ref. 3
NIC, NACv
Navigation integrity category and 
Navigation Accuracy Category ‐  4‐2
TRACON (SSR): 
NIC=6 NACv=1 Ref. 8
Velocity En Route (SSR): 
NIC=4, NACv=1 Ref. 8
WAAS: NIC=10, NACv=2
GPS SA Off: NIC=9, NACV=2
GPS SA ON: NIC=7, NACv=1 Ref. 23
rS_Integrity Surveillance integrity detection interval 4‐2 HRMANSP_Review Ref. 8
tS_Terrestrial Surveillance terrestrial latency 4‐2 3.5 sec Ref. 7
3.0 sec Ref. 8
Modified Flight 
Plans 4‐5 Automation
Host Computer Processing time 4‐5 1 sec Estimate
ANSP 
Workstation Processing time 4‐5 1 sec Estimate
n # of ATC coordination nodes 4‐5 0: 80% Estimate
4‐5 1: 15%
4‐5 2: 5%
ANSPLapse NASP lapse due to distractions 4‐5
Mean: 15 sec
Std: 3 sec Estimate
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Table 4-4. Summary of communication and maneuver modeling and performance references 
Communication
tComm_Terrestrial Communication terrestrial latency 4‐5 5 sec (95 percentile)  Ref. 8
HRMANSP_Review HRM for ANSP review 4‐6 99%: 6 sec Ref. 8
HRMPilot_Preview HRM for pilot preview 4‐6 σ=0.35 sec Ref. 24
HRMPilot_Review HRM for pilot review 4‐6 σ=0.44 sec Ref. 24
HRMANSP_Voice HRM for ANSP voice communication 4‐6
Voice: 
μ=12.88 sec, 
σ=4.95 sec (1st Short) Ref. 25
HRMPilot_reject HRM for pilot to reject a clearance 4‐6 N(8,2) Estimate
N # of negotiation of a clearance 4‐6
=0 (99%)
=1 (1%) Estimate
rC communication trasmission interval 4‐8 0.35 Ref. 23
p C_FC communication sucessful probability 4‐8 f(D, ρGS & Traffic) Ref. 22
p C_A Availability of communication 4‐8 0.999 Ref. 3
p C_C Continuity of communication 4‐8 0.999 Ref. 4
p C_I Integrity of communication 4‐8 10‐7 Ref. 4
CD&R
tCD&R CD&R processing time 4‐9 2 sec Ref. 13
Maneuver
CDZ (NM) 3‐4 1+uncertainty Baseline
3
Terminal 
separation 
minimum
5
En route 
separation 
minimum  
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5 Test Design 
To investigate the required separation assurance performance under the two selected SA system 
architectures, the focus is on the tradeoff of the key performance parameters associated with the three 
major elements in both ground-based and airborne concepts of operations.  These three elements are 
surveillance, communication, and maneuver, where surveillance and communication are based on 
datalink communication under NextGen technology, and maneuver performance depends on both 
surveillance and communication performance and flight dynamics.  Test parameters were developed from 
characteristics of the system architectures such that subsystem performance sensitivity and tradeoffs could 
be studied.  Each SA system architecture was modeled in MATLAB® based on descriptions discussed in 
Section 4.  A Monte Carlo simulation was developed to execute the test matrix presented in Section 5.1.3. 
5.1 Availability, Continutity, and Integrity 
The datalink performance metrics of availability, continuity, and integrity in surveillance and 
communication subsystems were selected according to DO-242A for 1090 MHz surveillance 
performance, which is defined as 0.9995, 0.9998, and 10-6 with respect to the availability, continuity, and 
integrity. Availability for communication defined by DO-224B is 0.999.  Continuity and integrity 
performance for the communication system, found in a draft of the FAA’s Final Program Requirements 
for Data Communications, are 0.999 and 10-7, respectively.4  These values are used as the baseline test 
case.  The developed model is capable of studying the impact of these three parameters on the overall 
required separation assurance performance. 
5.2 Actual Separation Assurance Performance (ASAP) 
The tests were developed to calculate the actual separation assurance performance, tASAP, based on a 
range of test conditions.  The Monte Carlo simulation ran 10,000 times for each test condition to establish 
a statistical database.  Each ASAP consists of four performance components, i.e., i) surveillance time to 
generate CD&R, tSurveillance, ii) processing time for CD&R, tCD&R, iii) communication time to complete an 
SA communication transaction, tCommunication, and iv) maneuver time for a lateral or vertical offset SA 
maneuver, tManeuver.  The 95th percentile of the tASAP was then used to determine the required separation 
assurance performance.  The required separation assurance performance, tRSRP, is defined in Equation 9.  
Individual required performance elements are also represented by the 95th percentile values as shown in 
Equations 10-12. The value of tCD&R is assumed to be a constant at two seconds for this study.   
     tRSAP =  tASAP @95th percentile = (tSurveillance + tCD&R + tCommunication + tManeuver ) @95th percentile      (9) 
                               tRequired_Surveilance =  tSurveillance @95th percentile         (10) 
                           tRequired_Communication =  tCommunication @95th percentile                                                (11) 
                                 tRequired_Maneuver =  tManeuver @95th percentile                                                      (12) 
5.3 Test Matrix 
The following test parameters were developed to investigate their effects on ASAP.  Based on the two 
SA concepts, i.e., ground-based and airborne, a test matrix was developed to include the following test 
parameters: range, air traffic density, uncertainty and accuracy of the surveillance performance, datalink 
communication performance, datalink vs. voice communication, ground speed of the ownship, and 
separation minimum. 
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A medium-density terminal case with a traffic density that is equivalent to the 1999 LA basin14 was 
chosen as the baseline, and both nominal and off-nominal conditions were evaluated.  The test matrix is 
shown in Table 5-1.  Test Cases 0-29 were developed for the ground-based SA system architecture.  Test 
Cases 100-155 were developed for the airborne SA system architecture.  The baseline cases, i.e., Test 
Cases 0 and 100 for ground-based and airborne concepts respectively, also have the availability, 
continuity, and integrity as defined in Section 5.1.1.  For the airborne concept, the surveillance time to 
acquire 2 intent messages was chosen as the baseline following References 3 and 14 in separation 
assurance applications. 
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Table 5-1. Test matrix for the required separation assurance performance study 
Surveillance Communication Maneuver
Test Categories Density   Uncertainty
Manual or
Lapse Flight Plan Mod Datalink/Voice Gnd Speed CDZ  
GND
Test 
Case
AFR
Test 
Case
ADS-B
+ SSR ADS-B Only
Center 
SSR
TRACON
SSR NIC NACV
p1
(No ANSP
Lapse)
p11
(pModified_Plans)
VDL Message
 Size
VDL Mean 
Rate pC_Availability
VGND 
(Knots)
Traffic
Type RBuffer (NM)
Intent
Message
(#)
p 2
(1090 
MHz
Intent)
0 100
Med 
Density,
DO-260B  10 2 0.999 0.02 1856 UL/1224DL 62 UL/85 DL 0.999 450 757-Dash8 1 2 0.99
1 101 250
2 102 350
3 103 550
4 104 757-757
5 105 3
6 106 5
7 107 9 2
8 108 7 1
9 - 6 1
10 - 4 1
11 111 757-747
14 - 10% +
15 - 10% +
16 116
Enroute 
density DO-
242A
17 117
Low 
Density, 
DO-260B
18 118
Med 
density, 
DO-260B
19 119
High 
density, 
DO-260B
20 -
Enroute 
density 
DO-242A
21 -
Low 
Density, 
DO-260B
22 -
Med 
density, 
DO-260B
23 -
High 
density, 
DO-260B
24 - 0
25 - 0.05
26 - 0.1
27 - 0 (voice)
28 - 1 (datalink)
29 - 0.98
‐ 151 0
‐ 152 1
‐ 153 4
‐ 154 0.5
‐ 155 0
AFR Tests Only
Datalink Performance
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6  Test Results and Performance Analysis  
Test results based on 10,000 runs per test case are summarized in this section to show the effects of 
different test parameters on the actual separation assurance performance (ASAP) of each SA concept.  
The ground-based concept results are presented first, followed by the airborne concept results.  For this 
study, 95th percentile values of ASAP, surveillance, communication, and maneuver performance are 
chosen to define required separation assurance performance, surveillance performance, communication 
performance, and maneuver performance respectively, and are labeled by T95 in all the figures.  A 
ground-based ASAP of the baseline test case, i.e., TC0, at 20 NM away from an ADS-B radio station is 
shown in Figure 6-1 as an example of how the 95th percentile values were determined. 
 
 
Figure 6-1. Determination of the 95th percentile from 10,000 runs of ground-based baseline case, 
TC0, at 20 NM from the ADS-B radio station 
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6.1 Ground-Based Separation Assurance System Architecture 
Two separation assurance maneuvers were investigated, i.e., lateral offset maneuver and vertical offset 
maneuver.  The results are presented in the following sections. 
6.1.1 Lateral Offset Separation Assurance Maneuver 
This section discusses the effects of various parameters for a lateral offset maneuver as described in 
4.1.3.3.1. 
6.1.1.1 Traffic Density Effects 
The effects of the traffic density, which mainly affected 1090 interference (FRUIT rate) are shown in 
Figure 6-2, where four levels of density are presented, i.e., en route, low density, medium density, and 
high density.  En route density is developed from DO-242A, and LA-Low, LA-Medium, and LA-High 
densities were developed based on traffic density from the Los Angeles Basin ADS-B Measurement 
Trials identified in DO-260B.14  Figure 6-2(a) shows the effects of traffic density and range on  tASAP, 
which includes tSurveillance,,  tCommunication,,and tManeuver, Figure 6-2(b), (c), and (d) respectively.  All 
performances shown are at the respective 95th percentiles of the results where “T95” is labeled.   
From Figure 6-2(b), surveillance performance shows strong dependency on traffic density and range 
from the ADS-B ground radio station. The values of tSurveillance are all under 30 sec, which meets ref. 8 in 
both terminal and en route airspace to detect a separation standard violation.  The baseline test case (lines 
in dark blue) used traffic density the same as LA-Med traffic density (lines in dark blue) but with ADS-B 
availability at 0.9995, while the other four test cases, i.e., TC16-TC19, were with 100% ADS-B 
availability.  
With the exception of the LA-High traffic density condition (TC19, lines in magenta), values of the 
95th percentile of surveillance time, tSurveillance, as shown in Figure 6-2(b), are consistent with ref. 3, i.e., 
meeting the required State Vector report update interval within 12 sec (95th percentile) in acquisition 
range between 20 and 90 NM for the terminal and en route airspace domains.  However, for the LA-High 
traffic density condition, tSurveillance is greater than this performance specification.  
The communication performance, tCommunication in Figure 6-2(c), does not show a significant effect due 
to traffic density.  The maneuver performance, tManeuver in Figure 6-2(d), shows a strong effect due to 
traffic density.  The CDZ for a lateral offset maneuver, which shows a clear dependency on the 
surveillance performance, is shown in Figure 6-2(e).   
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(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver
(e) CDZ
 
Figure 6-2. Actual separation assurance performance due to traffic density 
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6.1.1.2 Surveillance Uncertainty and Accuracy Effects 
Five surveillance uncertainty and accuracy conditions were investigated as shown in Table 4-2, with 
the same traffic density.  They are WAAS, Selective Availability Off, Selective Availability On, 
TRACON SSR, and Center SSR.  Figure 6-3 shows the effects on the tASAP due to the surveillance 
uncertainty and accuracy.  Figure 6-3(d) and (e) show that tASAP reflects strong effects of the surveillance 
uncertainty and accuracy on tManeuver and CDZ.  Results also show that the 95th percentile of tASAP of all 
(e) CDZ
(a) tASAP
(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver
(b) tSurveillance
 
Figure 6-3. Actual separation assurance performance due to surveillance uncertainty and accuracy 
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ADS-B based surveillance, i.e., WAAS, Selective Availability Off, and Selective Availability On 
conditions, are all under the two-minute alert suggested in DO-242A for separation assurance 
applications.  The 95th percentile of tASAP for TRACON SSR and Center SSR shows an alert greater than 
two minutes will be required.  Both required surveillance time, tSurveillance in Figure 6-3(b) for ADS-B 
based surveillance, and required communication time, tCommunication in Figure 6-3(c), show independence to 
surveillance uncertainty and accuracy as expected. 
CDZ as shown in Figure 6-3(e), seems to suggest that the separation minimum in the terminal 
airspace, i.e., within 60 NM of the airport, could be reduced from the current 3 NM minimum separation 
standard when GPS surveillance is available via WAAS, Selective Availability Off, and Selective 
Availability On.  With TRACON SSR, the 95th percentile of CDZ is at 2.78 NM at 40 NM, which is close 
to the current horizontal separation minimum in the terminal airspace of 3 NM.  With Center SSR, the 
95th percentile of CDZ is at 5.6 NM at 90 NM, which is greater than the current 5 NM minimum 
horizontal separation minimum in en route airspace. 
6.1.1.3 Datalink Communication Media, Datalink vs. Voice 
The impacts of message size and transmission rate on VDL-2 based datalink performance were 
investigated.  Results are shown in Figure 6-4, which shows a minimal effect within the range of interest, 
(a) tASAP (b) tCommunication
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-4. Effects on ASAP due to communication message size and transmission rate 
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i.e., between 20-90 NM.  However comparing datalink only as the communication media vs. voice only, 
as shown in Figure 6-5, shows drastic differences with datalink, which provided improved ASAP 
performance relative to voice communication.  From Figure 6-5(a), both datalink and voice show a two-
minute alert will be on the conservative side.  All performance shows relatively low sensitivity due to 
range, which is expected since the VDL-2 model does not include the signal degradation due to distance. 
6.1.1.4 CDZ Effects 
The effects due to buffer size or separation minimum is determined by comparing the 95th percentile of 
tASAP between the baseline case with cases where CDZs are set to 3 NM and 5 NM, as shown in Figure 6-
6(e), which are equivalent to current minimum horizontal separation distance in the terminal and en route 
airspace, respectively.  The baseline case has a 1 NM buffer plus uncertainty of the position and velocity 
accuracy according to NIC and NACV.  Based on 95th percentile of tASAP, both 3 NM and 5 NM CDZ will 
require an alert time greater than two minutes.  
 
(a) tASAP (b) tCommunication
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-5. Effects on ASAP due to datalink and voice 
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(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver
(e) CDZ
 
Figure 6-6. Effects on ASAP due to CDZ or separation minimum 
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6.1.2 Vertical Offset Separation Assurance Manevuer 
Effects due to traffic density using a vertical offset maneuver are shown in Figure 6-6.  Surveillance 
and communication performance, i.e., tSurveillance and tCommunication in Figures 6-7(b) and (c), are very similar 
to the lateral offset cases as expected.  Time to perform a vertical offset maneuver, tManeuver in Figure 6-
7(b), takes almost twice that for a lateral offset maneuver (approximately 44 sec, Figure 6-2(d)).  The 
values of 95th percentile of tASAP as shown in Figure 6-7(a) for the medium and high terminal traffic 
density, i.e., LA-Med and LA-High, exceed two minutes.  
6.2 Airborne Separation Assurance System Architecture 
Airborne SA results are presented in this section.  Two SA maneuvers were investigated, i.e., lateral 
offset maneuver and vertical offset maneuver. 
(a) tASAP (b) tCommunication
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-7. Effects on ASAP due to traffic density with a vertical offset maneuver 
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6.2.1 Lateral Offset Maneuver 
This section shows the effects of various parameters for a lateral offset maneuver. 
6.2.1.1 Traffic Density Effects 
Results for traffic density effects on the airborne SA system architecture actual separation assurance 
performance (ASAP) are shown in Figure 6-8, for four intent messages.  Since the flight deck performs 
self-separation, no ground-to-flight deck communication is required when all intent information is 
obtained from the ADS-B Trajectory Change messages and/or Target State message.  The value for 
tSurveillance includes a 1% probability that intent information for IFR aircraft is obtained from the ground via 
VDL-2 as shown in Figure 4-9.  All tASAP values are under two minutes using the assumption that two TC 
intent messages are required for the airborne concept.  Figure 6-8(a) also shows that in less congested 
airspace, e.g., en route in green, where airborne concept is most applicable, a 60 sec alert time is 
adequate.  The baseline case (TC100) is overlapping with the TC118, which both have the same traffic 
density, i.e., LA-Med, as expected with the only difference in ADS-B’s availability at 99.9% vs. 100% 
respectively.   
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-8. Traffic density effects on ASAP of the Airborne SA system architecture  
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6.2.1.2 Surveillance Accuracy Effects 
Three surveillance accuracy conditions were tested, which are WAAS, Selective Availability Off, and 
Selective Availability ON.  WAAS represents the surveillance accuracy in the NAS, while Selective 
Availability Off represents oceanic airspace where WAAS is not available.  Effects due to surveillance 
accuracy are shown in Figure 6-9, which shows that Selective Availability On has the largest CDZ 
relative to WAAS and Selective Availability Off to ensure separation assurance.  In these test cases, the 
time for surveillance, tSurveillance, for all three cases is the same since the surveillance time is independent of 
the accuracy.  The CDZs, as shown in Figure 6-9(d), show the dependency due to the uncertainty and 
accuracy in the surveillance data.  Values of all the 95th percentile of tASAP are all under two minutes at the 
given surveillance accuracy levels. 
. 
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-9. Accuracy effects on ASAP of an airborne SA system architecture  
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6.2.1.3 Number of Intent Messages Effects 
Effects due to number of intent messages from the airborne transmitted ADS-B messages are shown in 
Figure 6-10, which shows tASAP’s dependency with respect to the range and number of intent messages.  
With two intent messages, i.e., the baseline case (lines in blue), where intent messages are broadcast 
sequentially at 0.8 message/sec under the terminal medium density or LA-Med, the required separation 
assurance time, i.e., the 95th percentile values of tASAP in Figure 6-10(a), is significantly less than two 
minutes, and the CDZ in Figure 6-9(d) is significantly less than the current 3 NM separation minimum. 
With four intent messages (TC153) as shown in Figure 6-10(a) (lines in sky blue), values of the 95th 
percentile of tASAP is also under the two-minute alert. 
  
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-10. Number of intent messages effects on ASAP of an airborne  
SA system architecture  
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6.2.1.4 CDZ Effects 
The effects due to three different CDZs are shown in Figure 6-11, where the baseline case, which 
includes a 1 NM buffer plus surveillance uncertainty and accuracy, is compared with 3 NM and 5 NM.  
tManevuer is the most dominant factor in maintaining separation assurance performance for a B757 size of 
airplane to make a 3 or 5 NM lateral offset maneuver.  An alert time of more than two minutes is required 
for all 5 NM CDZs at any range.  An alert time of more than two minutes is required for surveillance 
range greater than 40 NM for the 3 NM CDZ case.    
 
 
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-11. Effects on ASAP due to CDZ 
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6.2.1.5 Ownship Speed Effects 
Since ASAP performance is measured in time, ownship ground speed was expected to have an effect 
on tASAP.  Figures 6-12(b) and (d) show surveillance performance, tSurveillance, and CDZ respectively are 
independent of ownship speed as expected.  But the time to maneuver for a lateral offset, tManeuver, is 
dependent on ownship ground speed.  In all cases, the 95th percentile of tASAP is under two minutes. 
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-12. Effects on ASAP due to ownship’s speed 
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6.2.1.6 Ground Intent Effects 
Obtaining timely intent information is essential to the airborne separation assurance operational 
concept.  Figure 6-13 shows the effects due to the source of the intent messages.  In the baseline case, 
TC100, 99% of intent messages are from 2 ADS-B Trajectory Change (TC) messages with 1% from the 
ground, Test Case 154 (TC154) considers 50% of the intent messages coming from airborne ADS-B 
messages and 50% from the ground, and Test Case 155 (TC155) considers 100% of the intent messages 
coming from the ground.  For both ground-provided intent cases (TC154 and TC155), number of intent 
message was uniformly distributed between 1 to 8 messages, which would be equivalent to an average of 
4 messages to be comparable with the highest ADS-B TC messages, i.e., four, in TC153.  The results 
show that surveillance time from TC155, i.e., 100% of intent from the ground, takes less time than the 
baseline case with two TC intent messages and the 50/50 split between the airborne and ground intent 
case (TC154), as shown in Figure 6-13(b).  This suggests that obtaining intent from the ground is faster 
than from airborne ADS-B intent with two TC messages.  Further investigations are needed to assess the 
effects of the additional VDL-2 communication, which is used to support the ground-intent uplink in this 
study. 
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tManeuver (d) CDZ  
Figure 6-13. Effects on ASAP due to source of intent messages 
  
54 
 
6.2.2 Vertical Offset Maneuver 
For a 1000 ft vertical offset maneuver, ASAP responses according to traffic density for the airborne 
separation assurance ConOps are shown in Figure 6-14.  The values of tSurveillance as shown in Figure 6-
14(b) are very similar to the lateral offset maneuver case which is expected.  Time to maneuver, tManeuver 
as shown in Figure 6-14(c), however, is significantly larger than the lateral offset maneuver as shown in 
Figure 6-8(c).  As shown in Figure 6-14(a), the required separation assurance performance, or values of 
the 95th percentile of tASAP, are greater than two minutes for the high traffic density case (TC119), i.e., 
LA-High for surveillance range greater than 64 NM.    
(a) tASAP
(b) tSurveillance (c) tManeuver  
Figure 6-14. Effects on ASAP due to traffic density for a vertical offset maneuver 
  
55 
 
6.3  Comparing Ground-Based and Airborne Results 
Figure 6-15 shows the comparison between the ground-based and airborne separation assurance 
concept baseline cases, i.e., TC0 vs. TC100, for a lateral offset SA maneuver.  Since no communication is 
required for the airborne concept, values of 95th percentile of tASAP are smaller for the airborne concept 
(a) tASAP (b) tSurveillance
(c) tCommunication (d) tManeuver
(e) CDZ
 
Figure 6-15. Comparison of ASAP between ground-based and airborne baseline cases 
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than the ground-based, as indicated in Figure 6.15(a).  It is noted that tSurveillance in Figure 6-15(b) for the 
ground-based case (TC0), is less than the airborne case (TC100). This is due to in the ground-based case 
the surveillance time is determined by the reception of a single ADS-B position message at a broadcast 
rate of 2 messages/sec, while in the airborne case the surveillance time is determined by the reception of 
both of two TC messages broadcast at 0.4 messages/sec.  Both cases, however, show they are within the 
two-minute alert as indicated in ref. 3.  From the CDZ shown in Figure 6-15(e), both ground-based and 
airborne concepts support a significantly lower separation minimum than the existing standard of 3 NM in 
the terminal airspace under a separation assurance system architecture based on ADS-B surveillance and 
datalink communication. 
Since ADS-B reception performance is highly affected by traffic density, a comparison of the ground-
based case and airborne case at the highest traffic density, i.e., LA-High, is made for TC19 and TC119.  
Figures 6-16(a) shows that due to higher surveillance time to receive both of two TC messages at a lower 
broadcast rate under high traffic density or higher interference, the value of the 95th percentile of tASAP for 
the airborne case (TC119), where no communication time is needed, is higher than the ground-based case 
(TC9) beyond the 67 NM range.  Both SA concepts still meet the two-minute alert time. 
 
Figure 6-16. Comparison between the ground-based and airborne concepts under high traffic 
density 
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7 Conclusions 
A statistical-based simulation model was developed to investigate required separation assurance 
performance based on the NextGen technology enablers in surveillance and communication, which are 
ADS-B and VDL-2 respectively.   The simulation framework was constructed following two 
representative separation assurance system architectures, i.e., ground-based and airborne-centric concepts, 
with three major elements: surveillance, communication, and flight maneuver.  The objective was to 
develop objective measurements to determine the required separation assurance performance according to 
specified operational performance metrics, e.g., availability, continuity, and integrity in surveillance and 
communication subsystems.  Additional parameters were also included in the model, such as range, air 
traffic density, uncertainty and accuracy of surveillance, datalink rate and message length.  Off-nominal 
operational conditions, including falling back to voice for communication and Secondary Surveillance 
Radar as a backup for surveillance when ADS-B was not available, were also included in the 
investigation.  Human performance responses were modeled based on results from applicable studies, and 
terrestrial network latencies were adapted from existing specifications. 
The following conclusions are developed from the test results. 
1) The results support a two-minute alert time as suggested in ref. 3 for an ADS-B based surveillance 
system architecture and 1 NM buffer zone.  The alert time can be reduced to one minute in less 
congested airspace such as en route airspace. 
2) The Collision Detection Zone (CDZ) developed based on surveillance uncertainty and accuracy, 
which is equivalent to the separation minimum, shows a horizontal separation minimum of less 
than 2 NM for a GPS-based surveillance system.  Under the TRACON SSR case, CDZ is 
consistent with the current horizontal separation minimum at 3 NM.  However, for the Center SSR 
case, CDZ developed under the methodology in this study is greater than the current horizontal 
separation minimum of 5 NM. 
3) Under the ground-based separation assurance system architecture, required communication time or 
tCommunication for datalink is significantly less than the voice communication. 
4) Under the airborne concept with up to four intent messages, tASAP shows the two-minute alert time 
is very conservative with the given 1 NM buffer zone. 
5) Under the airborne concept, the ground-provided intent via VDL-2 takes less time than the four 
Trajectory Change messages from the airborne ADS-B link. 
6) The airborne concept shows less tASAP than the ground-based separation assurance system 
architecture as expected since communication on the resolution maneuver is not required under 
that concept. 
7) The vertical offset maneuver in both ground-based and airborne concept of operations shows 
significant maneuver time increase over the lateral offset maneuver. 
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8 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made to improve the methodology and models developed under 
this effort. 
1. The 1 NM buffer is an arbitrary estimate to account for unexpected events developing during the 
flight maneuver such as weather or sudden change of the intruder trajectory.  This buffer needs to 
be investigated with human-in-the-loop simulation under different encounter geometries to 
determine the proper value to be used. 
2. The methodology to account for surveillance uncertainty and accuracy needs to be verified to 
ensure compliance with the existing horizontal separation minimum supported by Center SSR. 
3. When intent surveillance information is used in the airborne separation assurance concept under 
high traffic density, resulted surveillance performance exceeds recommended State Vector report 
update interval.  Further investigations are recommended to determine if new performance 
requirements are needed for ADS-B applications that require intent information in addition to the 
State Vector reports. 
4. The VDL-2 model does not account for signal degradation due to distance as the ADS-B reception 
model does.  Inclusion of this RF transmission property, i.e., free-space loss, is desired.     
5. A literature search should be conducted to document human performance response according to 
datalink applications under the NextGen environment and to enhance the fidelity of human 
performance response used in the simulation developed in this study. 
6. Several subsystems’ performances were represented by engineering estimates, e.g., human 
operator lapse due to distraction, ANSPLapse, and processing time at Host and ANSP Workstation.  
Future studies will be needed to enhance the fidelity of these modeling elements.  
7. A human-in-the-loop simulation should be conducted with various encounter geometries to test 
and verify separation assurance performance for surveillance, communication, and flight 
maneuver, and the results should be applied to refine the model to support future separation 
assurance requirement estimates. 
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